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FIDUCIARIES-CORPORATE AND LAWYERS*
By JuLIus HENRY COHEN**
Mr. Chairman, members of the Indiana State Bar Association, officers of the Indiana Bankers' Association, ladies and
gentlemen:
I have chosen for the title of my address, "FiduciariesCorporate and Lawyers," because I purpose developing in the
course of my talk the parallel lines of fiduciary obligations that
do or should govern the conduct of corporate fiduciaries, as well
as the conduct of lawyers. If you do not mind, I shall deliberately leave the main highway of my subject for a while to take a
road not so frequented and yet perhaps a little more interesting.
I promise you the detour will lead us back to the main highway.
Many attempts have from time to time appeared in literature
in which authors of imagination and brilliance have projected
their vision of the future form of society through interesting
description. Such, of course, are Bellamy's Looking Backward,
Samuel Butler's Erewhon and H. G. Wells' When the Sleeper
Wakes. There also have been such keen satires on society as
Dean Swift's Gulliver's Travels. Recently there appeared a
very interesting satire in which the author, Owen Johnson,
describes society in the year 2181. John Bogardus had been
put into a frigidrome in 1929, scientifically frozen and awakened
to find himself in a society governed entirely by women, where
men were preserved only for purposes of continuing the race
and were kept herded like prize cattle. Naturally, one turns to
ascertain what position lawyers would occupy in such a state of
society. Johnson describes this scientific future civilization as
follows:
"The highest caste is called the Minervenes. This comprises the highest
types of mind, the scientists, the philosophers, the teachers, the doctors

and the governors or administrators."
"What has become of the lawyers?
"I'm not sure I understand what you mean by lawyers.
lawyers? Do you mean law makers?"

What were

"On the contrary," I hesitated before an obvious witticism before reply-

ing. "Lawyers interpreted the laws. In my day there were so many laws
* An address delivered to the Indiana State Bar Association at Indianapolis, January 16, 1932.

** Of the New York Bar.
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and so often in conflict that no one ever contemplated any step without
recourse to a lawyer."
"Laws that have to be interpreted. How strange!"
"But how can you leave property without a lawyer to draw up the
will?"
"There is no one to leave property to. Everything returns to the state,
and the state fixes the income of each according to merit."
"But surely there are such things as income taxes?" Acquilla shook
her head. "But in your life don't you buy or sell?" "Certainly, but all
this is arranged through government agencies." "Then there were the
corporation lawyers who found the way to accomplish results that were
seemingly forbidden by laws."
"There are no privately owned corporations."
"Manifestly, then, there is no need of lawyers.
is a great progress."

This, I admit cheerfully,

A little later in the book, where the men are found in a field
playing games, John Bogardus asks, "But why don't they begin
to play?" observing a score of figures in conclave. Dianne
answers:
"Why, the teams aren't yet on the field."
"But the"Oh, those are the officials."
"Twenty-four officials!"
"I confess, dear, that I am not familiar with the great masculine sport,"
said Dianne, "but I believe that such a vast body of legislation has grown
up about the game that not only each player has to be watched by two
officials, but each team has to be represented by legal experts to argue on
the interpretations which may arise."
"'Then lawyers do exist!' I exclaimed."

You will observe that from this speculation on the scientific
future of civilization, we are led to believe that lawyers as a
class will exist even when there are no income taxes, no corporations-no, not even banks or trust companies. We may be
certain that there will be two things that will survive-lawyers
and games of sport, and lawyers will interpret and enforce, as
they do now, the rules of the game.
Now, there is a difference between the phrase "sport," as
descriptive of a man, and the term "sportsman." We describe
as "a good sport" usually a man who can take his losses cooly,
as does a gambler; but a good sportsman is a different person
altogether. We sometimes think that sportsmanship is really
the play of competitive spirits and we have taken much of the
competition of business over into sport. A good sportsman, in
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the true sense, has written an article in the Atlantic Monthly
for January, 1932, which I commend to those who would get
the most out of their outdoor play. The title of the article is:
"Play Hard," and the point of it is that American sportsmanship on the whole takes the attitude that a game is something
"which one should go in to win. To play fair, but to play hard;
to give one's best, and if possible to win."
"Let's see if we can't break a hundred this morning.

Then we will

attempt to break ninety next week, and eighty next month. Why? Because it seems eminently desirable to do so, because trying hard and breaking records is part of our sporting credo."
The result is, as the author points out, we get very little
change in what we turn to upon the golf course from the competitive action in the business world. "Look around," he says,
"and you will notice that we are a country of men old and worn
at forty, gray-haired, tired, exhausted, when we should be at
our physical and mental best. Abroad there are fewer champions and record breakers, but there men work, enjoy life, and
play until they are fifty, sixty, seventy; abroad they take things
more casually, the competitive spirit in life and sport is not
for ever urging them on and on and on until they are burned
out."
There is no finer sportsman than the English gentleman.
Even when the contest is hard and there is the desire to win,
the English gentleman is at his best. I take for my purpose two
incidents in the life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall, the great
English trial lawyer. ("For the Defense." The Life of Sir EdSir William Wilcox
ward Marshall Hall. By Marjoribanks.)
was the chemical expert in the Greenwood trial, a capital case
defended by Sir Edward Marshall Hall in 1920. There was a
sharp duel between Hall, for the defense, and Wilcox, one' of the
prosecution's principal witnesses. Sir Edward, says his biographer, was a very sick man throughout the trial; he could
neither stand up nor sit down without physical discomfort.
Says Marjoribanks:
"It is interesting to go behind the scenes and discover that the long
duel between the Crown expert and the defending advocate was made
physically possible only by the skill and kindness of the former."
"Sir William had been giving medical treatment and assistance at the
Ivy Bush Hotel throughout the trial to Marshall Hall, and, if it had not
been for this, the latter would never have fought his way through this
strenuous case as he did."
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The other incident is this. In 1912 Sir Rufus Isaacs was Attorney-General and prosecutor in the famous Seddon trial, in which
Sir Edward Marshall Hall successfully defended Seddon. Following the trial Sir Rufus wrote Sir Edward the following
letter:
"March 15th.
"My Dear Marshall . . . do let me say how much I admired your
defense, and whole conduct of the Seddons' case. Your five minutes' outburst for Mrs. Seddon made a most powerful impression; and, in my view,
did much-if not the most-for her acquittal. His case was a terribly
difficult one-the chain was as complete as circumstantial evidence can
make it-and you had a very hard task, when it was so plain to all that
the man had such a covetous nature, and was such a shrewd, cunning

fellow. But I didn't mean to discuss the case. I wanted to say again
what I said in your absence, in my speech, that it was a really magnificent
forensic effort, and the whole defense was conducted by you in accordance
with the highest traditions of our profession. I know you won't think it
impertinent for me to write this to you. It is meant, and will be understood by you, as the expression of an opponent, who loves to see work well
and nobly done .......

"Yours ever,
"Rurus D. IsAmCs."

I think you will agree with me that these are fine illustrations
of the sportsman-like spirit of the great leaders of the English
bar. The ability to achieve this poise and elevation which makes
a gentleman elicits our admiration, even when we fail to live up
to the fine standard ourselves. Take as an illustration this:
You are playing a keen match with a friend. You have had a
splendid drive; your brassie has landed you on the green with a
fairly good chance of a birdie. Your friend and adversary has
landed in the sand bunker on his second. It looks like your hole.
Easily but carefully he takes his niblick and with an explosion
shot he lifts his ball out of the trap, it drops on the green, slowly
meanders up to the cup and drops in. You miss your shot. Can
you say, "That was a fine shot, old man; it was simply bully"
and really mean it, really feel it? If you can, then you are a
true sportsman.
Perhaps you think I am wandering from my subject. I assure you I am not. I want to make clear that true sportsmanship means self-restraint and that whether we fall from the
high standards of our profession or not, the rules of the game
in our canons of ethics are the rules which should govern gentlemen and true sportsmen; and before I take my seat I hope to
persuade you that we need more of this spirit in the commercial
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as well as in the professional world. As late as 1888 Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge permitted himself to say in the great Mogul
Steamship Case:'
"It must be remembered that all trade is and must be in a sense selfish;
trade not being infinite, nay, the trade of a particular place or district
being possibly very limited, what one man gains another loses. In the
hand to hand war of commerce

.

.

.

men fight on without much thought

of others, except a desire to excel or to defeat them. Very lofty minds, like
Sir Philip Sidney with his cup of water, will not stoop to take an advantage,
if they think another wants it more. Our age, in spite of high authority
to the contrary, is not without its Sir Philip Sidneys; but these are counsels
of perfection which it would be silly indeed to make the measure of the
rough business of the world as pursued by ordinary men of business."

But since the time when this was written a great change has
come over us. The heads of large corporations have public responsibilities and trustee obligations. We are witnessing a conflict between standards, old standards dying hard and slowly
under the advance attack of the new. While it is true that executives still must plan to avoid "going into the red," there is a
substitution of the long range view of profit-making in place of
the old short range. Business men are looking beyond the tips
of their noses. Business institutions are no longer mushroom
affairs, built up on pioneer lines or for short term operation.
They are continuing corporate entities, with ownership distributed among stockholders who hold on to their shares, passing on to future generations their interests in these great
entities. The borrowing capacity of our great railroads, our
great utilities, our large industrial enterprises depends upon a
credit established on the basis of confidence that management
will look to tomorrow as well as today, and continue from today
for many tomorrows. Immediate gains are being subordinated
to substantial security. Out of the recent debacle has come
something for the future. More emphasis is placed on security
and stability than on large profit gains based on sharp turns of
the market. I think we may look forward with confidence to
business standards and practices which more and more will
take on the color of the older and more traditionally minded
professions. The profit making motive may still lead lawyers,
as well as business men, to violate the rules of the game, but in
the business world there are increasing number of good sportsmen who know already the long range value to all who play the
121 L. R. Q. B. D. 544, 553-4.
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game of conforming like gentlemen and true sportsmen to the
rules of the game. Here is a definite contribution we lawyers
may make. First we can hold fast to our own rules and standards of professional conduct, and secondly, we can explain the
reasons for them to our friends and working colleagues in the
business world. Perhaps, too, when they understand them, they
will apply them in their own field, for their own good and for
the good of society;
We have a long series of experiences, we lawyers. We have
what we call traditions. We have what we call codes of ethics.
These rules of the game have a philosophy back of them, a
philosophy which is not always understood. May I take you
into the field of the set of rules which I am satisfied is not
clearly understood, either by lawyers or by business men?
Under our traditional standards and under our existing canons
of ethics, lawyers have imposed upon themselves self-denying
ordinances. One of them is Canon 27. Let me read it to you:
ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
-lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is.the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter
of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not
per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied
real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of
deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business
by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments coicerning causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the

lawyer's positions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and
lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 2

What is the philosophy underlying this canon? In these days,
when almost every kind of service, as well as every kind of
merchandise, is introduced by salesmanship and advertising,
what is there about the professional man's services that precludes the use of modern methods in the development, let us
say, of his usefulness to others?
2 Canons of ProfessionalEthics, No. 27, American Bar Association.
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It so happened that as I was thinking about this address,
there came to my breakfast table two letters, one addressed to
Mrs. and the other addressed to Mr. As I opened mine, I found
myself cordially addressed as "Dear Friend" and I looked to
find the name of the writer, and in front of his name was "Dr."
In most intimate fashion he said he took the liberty of addressing "this message" to me. He assured me that he had been
highly successful as a dentist and that while recommendation
was a dentist's best advertisement and he preferred to secure
his patients in this manner, he would briefly enumerate some
of the facts which made his success possible. Before arriving at
the special features, he listed ten different elements as factors
which had made his success possible. I shall summarize them
briefly. His offices were well supplied with all the latest equipment for the performance of modern dentistry; all plate and
bridge work made in his own laboratories on the premises; all
extractions carefully done with gas or Novocaine; all instruments carefully sterilized; he uses the X-ray before commencing
work and no charge is made for the X-ray; only a fine grade of
tooth is employed and only a high grade of gold used; all fillings, inlays and crowns are carefully made; and, notice this
soothing, appealing sentence: "Gentle and sympathetic treatment, combined with unlimited patience is my objective and that
of my associates at all times." Mrs. didn't read hers. I turned
mine over to her and asked her what she got out of it. The
first reaction was, "Well, I guess he needs the practice." Then
I said: "Would you employ a dentist of that sort?" Mrs. replied: "First I would like to know some of his patients."
"Well, does the letter really inspire confidence in his professional skill?" The answer was, "No." Now, the gentleman
had violated the codes of ethics of the medical profession. Probably many people attracted by this kind of solicitation, did not
regard his self-praise either as poor sportsmanship, poor ethics
or poor business; and yet to anyone who knows anything at all
about professional service, the fact that a man exalts and extols his own virtues is prima facie evidence that he is not fit to
practice his profession. We are all aware that publicity seeking, conspicuity, front-page spectacular playing up of cases is
resorted to by men in our profession. We know our own opinions of such men. Their practices make them but contemptible
in our eyes. Undoubtedly, the gullible are led astray. We know
that probably the most expert, the most efficient, the most reli-
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able, the most trustworthy lawyers are those of whom the general public hears very little, if anything. In the old days, when
the trial lawyer was the dramatic figure in the community, in
the pioneer days of Lincoln, trial work, skilfully done, made of
the lawyer a dramatic hero. In some parts of the country this
is probably still true, but in the great metropolitan centers the
really great lawyers are those of whom the public hears little
or nothing. They are like the great surgeons, selected by their
professional brethren because of their skill, and if it is accompanied by a native modesty it enhances the personality of the
man. As a matter of fact, except for a few men at the bar, we
are all of us dependent for our rise upon the commendation of
our brethren. I can see in my memory's eye clearly the three
men, older than myself, who, at various critical points in my
career, took me upon their shoulders and lifted me up. I know
today that if it were not for the confidence of lawyers, which I
am not sure I deserve, I would not have much of my present
practice.
Is the discriminating selection of professional men on the
basis of character and ability something of value to the community? Is professional employment to follow blatant, noisy
self-exploitation? Is that in the interest of the community?
You know the answer. In New York the New York Academy of
Medicine and the County Medical Society recently issued a set
of instructions to physicians, which, while approving the use of
the press, the lecture platform, periodicals and the radio for the
purposes of furnishing legitimate scientific information to the
public, condemned without restraint such forms of publicity as
exploited individual physicians through mention of their names
in the public press. Even the newer professions are already
alive to the importance of these restraints. In a book dealing
with the ethics of the profession of accountancy, by A. P. Richardson, published under the auspices of the American Institute
of Accountants, it is said:
"The professional man who solicits the patronage of potential clients
must have an argument to adduce if he hopes to succeed. Without hope
of success who would debase himself to such a low point as to solicit?
The argument can only be praise of one's self, for that is what is offered
for sale. It is not merchandise nor commodity nor tangible thing, but
merely something immaterial, one's mental equipment and natural ability
augmented by training and education-at least that is what is supposed to
be offered. In order to convince the prospective buyer that these incorporeal
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assets exist, it is necessary to mention them in a laudatory way, which must
be repugnant to anyone with a sense of propriety. Can anyone imagine
that a soliciting accountant or lawyer or any other man would call upon
a possible client and offer his services without saying something in praise
of them? All of us are imbued with a spirit of vanity. If we are truthful
we admit that we think kindly of ourselves; but in the process of polishing
barbarity into civilization, conceit is one of the things which must be
obscured. The peacock may be a beautiful bird, but no one thinks very
well of his manners. Yet the person who goes about selling himself must
extol his own virtues much as the peacock spreads his tail."

I think as practical men we appreciate the difference between
selling merchandise by advertisement and salesmanship and selling professional services. If I go to one of the large department stores and buy something, I am not seriously injured if I
do not get my full money's worth. Under the liberal treatment
of the department stores, I can return the merchandise; but
even if I cannot, I take my loss and never go there again. But
if I go to a dentist, I know that he can do me a permanent injury while I am in his chair, in his physical control. I know
that a lawyer can do a client a permanent injury by drafting a
document which does not adequately express his purpose. I
know also that permanent injury can be done by inducing someone to put his property into an irrevocable trust. What are the
principles that govern the conduct of a fiduciary? They are the
highest principles of fidelity and trust. Never, never must the
fiduciary put himself in the position of setting up his own selfinterest against that of the beneficiary of the trust. We lawyers know the rule. I quote from Pomeroy:
"The Duty Not to Accept Any Position or Enter into Any Relation,
or Do Any Act Inconsistent with the Interests of the Beneficiary.-This

rule is of wide application, and extends to every variety of circumstances.
It rests upon the principle that as long as the confidential relation lasts
the trustee or other fiduciary owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary,
and cannot place himself in any other position which would subject him to
conflicting duties, or expose him to the temptation of acting contrary to the
best interests of his original cestui que trust. The rule applies alike to
and
agents, partners, guardians, executors and administrators, directors
3
managing officers of corporations, as well as to technical trustees."

Parties may not occupy positions of conflict of interest. The
Colorado Court of Appeals said in British Assurance Company
v. Cooper, 6 Colo. App. 25:
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th), Vol. 1, Sec. 1077, p. 2473.
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"The views of contracting parties are supposed to be in conflict. During the negotiation the interest of each is uppermost in his own mind, and
his efforts are directed to securing a recognition of that interest. If .he
acts by agent, he is entitled to the exclusive services of the agent in the
transaction, and to the full benefit of the agent's judgment and ability
in making terms with the other party. It is manifest that where the same
person assumes to act for both parties to a bargain he takes upon himself
duties which are incompatible. If he is honest, leaving out of consideration
any unconscious bias which might incline him toward one or the other
side, the utmost that can be expected of him is impartiality; but impartiality is exactly the qualification which is inconsistent with agency. The
agent is chosen to represent the interest of his principal against the hostile interest which he is to meet. He cannot discharge his duty and be
impartial. It is therefore impossible for a person acting in the same
transaction for two opposing parties to perform his duty to both; and a
contract made by him in this double capacity may be avoided by either
party, unless it was so made by his express authority, or unless with full
knowledge of the facts, he afterwards ratified it. And it is not necessary
for the purpose of avoiding it that the contract should be tainted with
fraud, or be disadvantageous to the complaining party. The right to
repudiate it grows out of the nature of the transaction itself, and is not
connected with any question of fraud, or of benefit or detriment which
might accrue from it to him."

Shanley's Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.4 was an action
to enjoin a corporate trustee from selling securities owned by

the trust estate. It appeared that the trustee in its representative capacity owned stock of certain companies which had been
leased to the Public Service Company and in which the Public
Service Company held a controlling interest and with which the
Public Service Company intended to merge. The Public Service
Company had offered to purchase the stock of these companies
from holders thereof. The trustee threatened to sell the stock

of the trust estate. Some of the directors of the trustee were
also directors of the Public Service Company and the trustee
was the financial agent of that company. Vice Chancellor
Backes, in enjoining the sale, said:
"Our trustee is not possessed of an independent and impartial judgment as to the advisability of selling the stock, and, if it be advisable, at
what price. A half dozen or more members of its board of directors are
directors of the Public Service Company. They represent both buyer and
seller. As stockholders of the Public Service Company they have a pecuniary interest in the sale. It may be slight, but that is unimportant. They
are our trustees, and the law demands of trustees the utmost fidelity. It
does not tolerate personal dealing with the trust estate nor permit the
4 138 Atl. 388 (N. J. 1927).
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making of a penny's profit. The rule is grounded in sound morals and is
reflected in the supplicating words of the Lord's prayer, 'Lead us not into
temptation.' This is not an imputation upon the motives of the directorate
of our trustee, but a simple statement of an elemental doctrine of the
obligations of trustees. Further, these directors of our trustee owe a corresponding duty of loyalty to the Public Service Company, of which they
are also trustees--directors are trustees. A trustee cannot serve two masters with sharply conflicting interests, equally well. It has been tried
before. It cannot be done. A simple illustration: The directors of our
trustee are in conscience bound to consider only the welfare of our wards
and strive for the best price obtainable; as directors of the Public Service
Company, their duty is no less to secure the most favorable terms. The
true balance is infinite. Trustees are not privileged to experiment with it.

In the dilemma in which it found itself, the course open to our trustee was
to apply to the court for instructions, not to compel our wards to appeal
for protection."

It is clear that in the performance of his duties the fiduciary
must never be governed by the element of profit. He occupies
a position wholly different from that occupied by the ordinary
business man. The rule in the Mogul Steamship Case has absolutely no application to fiduciaries. The rule of caveat emptor
is excluded from consideration. Not only must you refrain
from misleading the person with whom you are dealing, but you
must affirmatively disclose to him every fact which may possibly
have a bearing upon the problems that are disclosed. Under
these circumstances, it is impossible for a lawyer observing the
rules of law which govern fiduciaries, as well as the standards
of professional conduct set down for him by his profession, to
occupy a dual relation. He cannot act for the trust company
that is to receive the trust and for the donor or the will maker
who is creating the trust. The very nature of the relationship
is such that each party must have a lawyer disinterestedly pointing out the obligations and the implications of the document
about to be executed. The suggestion that, by common consent,
a lawyer may act for two parties of conflicting interest is out
of order where the relationship is solicited by one of the parties.
The assumption that, because the client is recommended to me
by a trust company, whom he has already decided upon as the
trustee, and thereby has removed the question of dual responsibility by his own action, is out of order. If I am to act as his
lawyer I must be absolutely free and unrestrained to criticise
the trust company itself which is under consideration as trustee. There is not a lawyer in any great metropolitan center
who has not information upon which he should and must base
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a discriminatory selection of banks or trust companies for fiduciary duties. He must exercise that judgment as freely as the
family doctor does in advising upon the selection of a surgeon.
He must have no self-interest in the selection. He must be free
to say that two trustees should serve, instead of one. If we are
to select fiduciaries as we select lawyers, on the basis of their
character qualification, how shall we do this if there is no discrimination? Do we say that all lawyers are competent and
qualified to perform the specific services called for in the given
situation? Do we say that every lawyer is competent as a trial
lawyer? Do we not discriminate between A and B, even to considering the nature of the case that is to be tried? I have no
hesitancy in saying that, in my own city, my contact with corporate fiduciaries is such that I rate three or four of them far
above all the others in the character of service they furnish, in
the kind of men at the head of their trust departments, in their
consideration of the delicate and subtle questions that come up
in connection with a trust. I would not lend my hand to a
document which selected any one of a number of corporate fiduciaries in New York whose record in certain cases I chance to
know. That knowledge belongs to my client. It is part of my
experience and skill which he is entitled to have when he comes
to me.
There is another consideration, and you will see that while I
have been on a detour in the early part of our travels, I am now
on the main highway. The rules of sportsmanship require that
they shall apply to Class A men, as well as Class B men and
Class C men. If the sand wedge is not to be used in the sand
trap, though it may mean a stroke in the game, it must not be
used by Class A men and forbidden to Class C men. If the development of practice by solicitation is forbidden to those lawyers whose practice is commercial or negligence casds, there
should be no discrimination in favor of men who can get business through the active solicitation and advertising of corporate
banks and trust companies. There cannot be one law for the
Sanhedrin and another for the congregation. There has been
some misunderstanding on this subject on the part of men of
outstanding leadership at the bar, who have not seen clearly the
implications of the fiduciary principle as applied to the relationship between trust companies and lawyers. But I am happy to
report to you that in our city, after several years of careful
study, a clear and explicit statement has been made by the two
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leading bar associations of the city and county. Let me read it
to you:
"Persons contemplating the making of a will or the establishment of a
trust should be fully advised by their own counsel before decision on matters such as (a) whether a trust should be created at all, (b) what should
be its duration, (c) whether it should be revocable or irrevocable, (d)
what qualifications are desirable for executor or trustee, (e) how many
fiduciaries should be named, and (f) what should be the powers, immunities and compensation of any such fiduciary.
"Decisions on all of these points are of serious importance and in
many cases irrevocable; and the desires of a prospective fiduciary may
frequently conflict with the best interests of the testator or creator of the
trust or of the beneficiaries thereof.
"There should be no divided allegiance upon the part of the lawyer
drawing or advising with respect to a will or trust agreement.
"In the judgment of the Associations a lawyer should not advise a
prospective testator or donor as to the making of a will or trust if the
lawyer already occupies a relationship to a proposed or potential fiduciary
which might embarrass him in advising fully and freely as to all matters
involved in the formation and terms of such trust. Such embarrassment
exists where the prospective testator or creator of the trust has come to
the attorney at the instance of any person or institution seeking to be
named as fiduciary.
"Moreover if an attorney habitually obtains clients as a result of
solicitation of fiduciary relationships by a corporate fiduciary, and such
solicitation is known to the attorney, he is acquiescing in the indirect procurement of professional employment and taking the benefits thereof.
"The Associations recognize as an exception to the foregoing principles, that past relations of trust and confidence may result in an attorney being peculiarly qualified, and consequently under a duty, to advise a
client in regard to his will or a contemplated trust. In such case he may
do so, irrespective of relations with the prospective fiduciary, if after full
disclosure the client so requests.
"Lawyers should refrain from assisting in or encouraging the distribution to laymen of form wills or trust indentures or similar documents, and
should endeavor to stop the practice, because of the danger in the use of
such documents without the revisions and corrections that are necessary
to meet the needs and intentions of the individual client under advice of
his own counsel."

It has been suggested that a strict literal reading of this announcement would preclude a lawyer from acceping a single
client on the recommendation of a bank or trust company. Why
should a bank or trust company be precluded from giving information as to the ability and qualifications of a lawyer if called
upon by a depositor? Theoretically nothing can be said in opposition to this, and I don't think the associations meant that
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the interpretation should be taken so literally; but the lawyer
must be on his guard. It so happens that, discussing the topic
I am discussing before you tonight, at a meeting of a small group
of lawyers in New York, this very question came up and one
of the lawyers present told this story. A young lawyer opened
his office on Main Street in a thriving town. On the same street
was also the office of the local trust company. Some of its
officials knew the young man and his name was added to the list
of lawyers which the trust company maintained. When a customer of the trust company had need of a lawyer and did not
know to whom to go, the trust company would suggest to the
customer some one of the lawyers on its list. So it happened
presently that a woman having in mind the creation of a trust
was sent to our young friend. He went over the situation with
her and finally gave it as his opinion that she ought not to create
a trust. Nothing happened. Later a man appeared at the little
office, armed with the suggestion from the trust company that
there should be included in the trust he was about to create a
provision that the trustee might invest the trust funds in securities other than those declared legal for trustees by the state.
The trust deed was drawn by the young lawyer but the provision
was not included. A little later something did happen and what
happened was this. On Main Street an official of the trust
company met the young man and he indicated very clearly that
this young man had disappointed him very, very much. Later
our friend found that the trust company knew as well as he did
that there were fifteen other lawyers in the town, and that
thereafter the sixteenth and newest member of the group would
be forgotten when a customer of the trust company wanted to
select a lawyer.
I think I have covered this phase of the discussion so that you
will understand the underlying philosophy, and I feel confident
that, as the leaders of banks and trust companies come to underderstand more fully this philosophy, they will themselves see its
value. For of what use is it carefully and painstakingly to build
up a reputation for efficiency and honor, if all are placed upon
the same level and the retainer or the business is to go to the
loudest and boldest and most pressing of your competitors? I
think that the fine men who have been at the head of large
banking institutions have allowed this problem to fall into the
hands of advertising men, go-getters, high powered salesmen,
who are utterly ignorant of the fiduciary principle, and in con-
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sequence the banking profession, as such, has been lowered and
demeaned. What an error to publish and distribute such a
document as this:
YOUR FAMILY, YOUR PROPERTY AND YOUR WILL
Blank Bank and Trust Company, Blankville
You should choose a trustee that will not only give expert and constant
business management to your estate, but will also give to your beneficiaries
sympathetic personal consideration in the matters which they bring to the
trustee's attention.
Our institution will give the personal interest which you desire your
family affairs to have. While we are impartial in family disputes, we deal
with each personal problem of a man's family in a friendly, individual way.
Our officers welcome discussion of these matters, and are always available
for this purpose.
Finally, a trust institution is of unquestioned financial responsibility.
This is highly important. Often a man in appointing his wife or other
individual will relieve the person appointed of the necessity of providing
a bond, out of a desire not to offend the person. This question need not
arise at all when we are appointed, as our financial responsibility under
our charter assures complete protection.

Note that this is in the form of a printed circular, to be used by
every trust company, without change. Suppose we lawyers got
up a circular of this sort and sent it around, advising the public
of the importance of our legal services and told everybody that
every lawyer at the bar was equipped to perform his work on
the same basis of equality. Would that be helpful to the community in bringing to the top the better men?
You will observe that I have not said anything up to this time
about the corporate practice of the law. In New York, after
about fifteen years, we have practically eliminated the corporate
practice of the law. I have given in a footnote, Section 280 of
our Penal Law,5 which has been most effective, but in addition
5 Corporationsand voluntary associations not to practice law.
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to
practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person other than itself
in any court in this state or before any judicial body, or to make it a
business to practice as an attorney-at-law, for any person other than
itself, in any of said courts or to hold itself out to the public as being
entitled to practice law, or to render or furnish legal services or advice,
or to furnish attorneys or counsel or to render legal services of any kind
in actions or proceedings of any nature or in any other way or manner,
or in any other manner to assume to be entitled to practice law or to
assume, use or advertise the title of lawyer or attorney, attorney-at-law, or
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equivalent terms in any language in such manner as to convey the impression that it is entitled to practice law, or to furnish legal advice, services or
counsel, or to advertise that either alone or together with or by or through
any person, whether a duly and regularly admitted attorney-at-law, or not,
it has, owns, conducts or maintains a law office or an office for the practice of law, or for furnishing legal advice, services or counsel. It shall
be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to solicit itself
or by or through its officers, agents or employees any claim or demand for
the purpose of bringing an action thereon or of representing as attorneyat-law, or for furnishing legal advice, services or counsel to, a person sued
or about to be sued in any action or proceeding or against whom an action
or proceeding has been or is about to be brought, or who may be affected
by any action or proceeding which has been or may be instituted in any
court or before any judicial body, or for the purpose of so representing
any person in the pursuit of any civil remedy. Any corporation or voluntary association violating the provisions of this section shall be liable to a
fine of not more than five thousand dollars and every officer, trustee,
director, agent, or employee of such corporation or voluntary association
who directly or indirectly engages in any of the acts herein prohibited or
assists such corporation or voluntary association to do such prohibited acts
is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact that any such officer, trustee, director,
agent, or employee shall be a duly and regularly admitted attorney-at-law
shall not be held to permit or allow any such corporation or voluntary
association to do the acts prohibited herein nor shall such fact be a defense upon the trial of any of the persons mentioned herein for a violation
of the provisions of this section. This section shall not apply to any corporation or voluntary association lawfully engaged in a business authorized
by the provisions of any existing statute, nor to a corporation or voluntary
association lawfully engaged in the examination and insuring of titles to
real property, nor shall it prohibit a corporation or voluntary association
from employing an attorney or attorneys in and about its own immediate
affairs or in any litigation to which it is or may be a party, nor shall it
apply to organizations organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or
for the purpose of assisting persons without means in pursuit of any civil.
remedy, whose existence, organization or incorporation may be approved by
the appellate division of the supreme court of the department in which
the principal office of said corporation or voluntary association may be
located.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent a corporation
from furnishing to any person, lawfully engaged in the practice of law,
such information or such clerical services in and about his professional
work as, except for the provisions of this section, may be lawful, provided
that at all times the lawyer receiving such information or such services
shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his clients for
the information and services so received. But not corporation shall be permitted to render any services which cannot lawfully be rendered by a
person not admitted to practice law in this state nor to solicit directly or
indirectly professional employment for a lawyer.
(Section 280, Penal Law, State of New York-Am'd by L. 1909, ch. 483.
Adm'd by L. 1911, ch. 317, and L. 1916, ch. 254. In effect April 18, 1916.)
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to that, in the year 1914, our Committee on Unlawful Practice of
the Law established the principle that the character of a corporation could be revoked if it undertook to practice law. The Attorney-General of the State, in the Matter of National Jewelers
Board of Trade,6 held that unless the corporate entity ceased to
furnish lawyers and lawyers' services, he would bring proceedings to revoke their charter. Since then almost every corporate
entity against whom complaint has been made has very promptly
indicated, either to our committee or to the district attorney,
that it prefers to change its practices rather than to have its
7
charter revoked. Moreover, in Matter of Pace and Stimson,
where lawyers' services were furnished by an out of town
corporation for the purpose of forming corporations, preparing
charters, minutes and the like, our court held, in disciplinary
proceedings, that the practice was unprofessional and that lawyers participating in such a practice would in the future be
severely disciplined. The lawyers in question were honorable
men and received merely a reprimand and a warning. I have
put in a footnote,8 the references to the recent decisions in Ohio
and Illinois. In Ohio the decision establishes the principle that
the right to practice law is an exclusive franchise, and that any
member of the bar may bring proceedings to restrain the practice of the law by anyone not authorized so to practice, whether
it be an individual or a corporation. In Illinois the principle is
established that a bank or trust company which practices law
may be punished for contempt of court. So far as the banks and
trust companies of New York City are concerned, as long ago as
1919 New York institutions publicly announced that they did not
practice or desire to practice law or draw legal documents, nor
have them drawn by their own counsel, and that it was the custom of most of the New York institutions to employ counsel for
the testators or donors in legal matters concerning those estates
or trusts. This position was reaffirmed in an address before
the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law of the
6 Annual Report of the Attorney-General of the State of New York for
the year ending December 31, 1914-Vol. II, p. 349, et seq.
7

170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. 641 (1915).

8 Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Assn. of Cleveland, Court of
Appeals of Cuyahoga County, State of Ohio, 8th Dist., March 9, 1931.

Ohio Law Bulletin and Reporter, p. 234-People ex rel. Illinois State Bar
Association and the Chicago Bar Association v. Peoples Stock Yards State
Bank, Supreme Court of Illinois. Opinion filed June 18, 1931. (The People v. Peoples Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462.)
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American Bar Association, at Atlantic City, New Jersey, on
September 16, 1931, by Merrel P. Callaway, Vice-President,
Guaranty Trust Company of N. Y. In his address, which was
entitled "Cooperation Between the Trust Companies and the
Bar," Mr. Callaway said:
We explained (1919) that the New York institutions did not practice,
or desire to practice, law, or draw legal documents, nor have them drawn
by their own counsel, and that it was the custom of most of the New York
institutions to employ counsel for the testators or donors in legal matters
concerning those estates or trusts.

You will see, therefore, that our recent problems have been
the problems of making our own canons of ethics applicable to
lawyers for trust companies, so that no group should profit indirectly by any practice of soliciting or advertising, even though
the soliciting or advertising be done by the client. The rules of
the game are applied to Class A players, as well as Class B and
Class C. Next we had the problem of making it clear that even
lawyers who are not on the payroll of banks or trust companies
must be sure that references to them by prospective testators
or donors should not put them in the embarrassing position of
serving conflicting interests. In the discussion of these phases
of the matter, which, you will observe, deal wholly with the
conduct of lawyers, we found ourselves studying the advertising
of the trust companies and considering in what respects the
form of advertising was consonant with the philosophy underlying the fiduciary relationship. Was there anything in the
philosophy underlying our code of ethics which was applicable to
the conduct of trust companies in their advertising? Personally
I think there is, and I have attempted to indicate the lines of
my reasoning in this presentation.
However, the extent to which the principles or the philosophy
which I have been developing applies to the advertising of banks
and trust companies for their trust department activities is a
matter for the corporate fiduciaries themselves to determine.
We think we have something to offer in the way of experience,
since we are fiduciaries ourselves, not only when we act as
executors or trustees but always. The relationship of attorney
and client in all of its aspects is fiduciary. Certainly a profession that has existed as long as ours ought to have something
to offer in the way of knowledge based upon experience. We
have tendered it to the newer profession, to the profession of
corporate fiduciaries. We do it in no spirit of hostility. We do
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it in the common interest. We want the public to have faith in
fiduciaries. We know that the best way of securing the best
kind of fiduciary service is to have the public select discriminatingly, on the basis of merit and character, and we know that
wholesale and indiscriminate soliciting and advertising fail to
achieve this end. It has been suggested that the corporate
fiduciaries form their own organization along the lines of a bar
association, and formulate for themselves their codes of ethics
and take steps to see that these standards are observed. I do
not know that there ever will be secured machinery like that
of the disciplinary committees that we have in our bar associations. I do not see how you can work out a method of disbarring
corporate fiduciaries who are guilty of unprofessional conduct.
We lawyers spend a good deal of money in New York in this
disbarment business, but I do not see yet how the fiduciaries are
going to work out such machinery. And here let me get back to
the beginning of my talk, to the elements of true sportsmanship,
for I believe now we have reached a crisis in the evolution of
economic society. I believe that we have come to the point where
we can no longer rely upon the old-fashioned pioneer competitive
methods of letting the devil take the hindmost. I do not know
whether you like the word "collective" or not. You may think
that it smacks of bolshevism or communism; but I think you are
applying in your daily activities the principle of collective action.
What is a corporation except a group, sometimes a very large
group, of individuals who join together in collective activity?
What are trade associations except a form of collective activity?
Such excellent suggestions as have come from Mr. Gerard Swope
of the General Electric Company for the organization of industry on the basis of self-government are in this category. That
is a long story. The garment industries in New York have tried
it. They have failed and they have succeeded. But it must
come. There must be restraints which an industry as a whole
puts upon its members. How far these restraints are to go we
do not yet see clearly. Some of them have been pointed out by
such excellent minds as Walker D. Hines. At the National Conference on the Relation of Law and Business, held at New York
University on October 26th, 1931, he said:
"In my opinion, arrangements to balance production with demand could

be tested by a principle inherently sound and entirely practicable because
its operation would be susceptible of being measured by attainable tests.
For example, statistics are or should be available to indicate fairly what

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is normal production and normal demand. An arrangement among the
producers that production shall be reasonably in balance with the demand
thus indicated and shall be open to readjustment as changes in the demand
become apparent is an entirely practicable arrangement and is readily distinguishable from arrangements which seek to create artificial shortages
regardless of demand."

It must come. Industry will go to rack and ruin if there is not
some agreement and understanding among those who constitute
the group. How far we shall change the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law we do not yet know. The general fear on the part of the
public is that the granting of power to groups to govern their
industry means the exploitation of the people by those who hold
the power. That is the philosophy back of the Sherman AntiTrust Law and the Federal Trade Commission, and we must
admit that historically there is a great deal of justification for
this fear. But there is coming the newer philosophy. This
philosophy carried the thought that we must permit collective
action by groups, not only in the interest of the group and all of
its members, but in the interest of society as a whole. Now,
how can you have effective collective action if you have not the
true spirit of sportsmanship? If men will not count their
strokes even when the other fellow is not looking, you cannot
play the game. Do we know what is happening in business today? James A. Farrell, addressing the members of the Steel
Institute in May, 1931, said, in speaking of the inability of the
captains of the steel industry by voluntary effort to avoid
ruinous competition by selling below cost:
"I do not see any hope of better prices in our business until the presidents of the companies are willing to stop this diabolical business-that is
the word-the most diabolical situation that ever was perpetrated in the
business-and it ought to be stopped.
"But it is not honest for us to go and sell our goods below the cost of
production and deprive our stockholders and our workmen of what they
are entitled to."

Let me give you a true story. It is vouched for by a member
of the bar, a friend of mine, who knows the facts. The names
are, of course, hidden. About twenty years ago in one of our
large cities there was a meeting of all the members of a certain
article of women's apparel, presided over by the president of the
association, a large manufacturer. The suggestion was made
at the meeting that the manufacturers had been cutting each
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other's throats by selling a certain kind of article under $1.75
a dozen. A resolution was offered that all the members of the
association should agree on a standard of production and quality
and not cut under $1.75. The presiding officer, while the matter
was under discussion, excused himself, seeing the motion was
going to prevail, got a substitute to take his place and went off
to the telephone. There he called up a number of cities in .which
there were large buyers, on the long distance telephone. He told
the buyers what was going to happen, and stocked them up to
the eyes at less than $1.75. When the resolution was passed, the
other members of the association found that all the big business
had been corralled.
In "The Coming of the Amazons" there appears this colloquy
between John Bogardus and Dianne. She is taking him by
aeroplane over the field where the men athletes, bred specially
for the spectacles, are playing. Says Dianne:
"They are really good for nothing else and we never mate them with
the higher castes."
"What's happening now?"
"The officials are searching the players, of course, before the game

begins."

"These preliminaries," we are told,
"were conducted with the minute fidelity of a police force. Not only were
the nose guards, head guards, neck protectors, ear mufflers, shoulder, knee
and elbow protectors searched for any metallic substance, but the soles
of the shoes were displayed against the possibility of murderous spikes.
That these precautions were not unnecessary was evidenced by the storm
of boos and groans which accompanied the unmasking of several players,
when the offenders were on the opposite side."

I think we must all agree that if we are not more and more
to resort to governmental control and regulation of business
and yet are to achieve that kind of economic planning which can
come only through collective agreement, we shall have to develop
a self-discipline in trade and business, as well as in the professions, that is more consonant with the true ideals of sportsmanship than we have heretofore employed. Isn't it too bad that
the man who plays a game with you on Saturday afternoon and
who will count every stroke whether you are looking or not,
and will never ground his club in the sand trap, will think it is
just clever business to do the very opposite on Monday morning,
if you happen to be his competitor? I think we members of the
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legal profession, looking over the field generally, must come to
the conclusion that these traditional standards of the game
which we have adopted are something of very great value
to civilization, and that instead of allowing them to be washed
down in the flood of pioneer competitive business, go-getting,
eager salesmanship and advertising, we should hold fast to them
as we hold fast to our homes. And I think that as the new
profession of corporate fiduciaries comes more and more to appreciate that this is not just a matter of lawyers trying to get
employment by eliminating competitors from the field, but goes
to the very heart of healthy community standards and rests
upon the effectuation as well as preservation of the fiduciary
principle, more and more the rules of the game that we have
found in our profession to be helpful will be taken over by
them, as the accountants and the engineers and other professions are now taking them over. There will be restraints upon
this matter of advertising and soliciting business by banks. If
there is not, it will simply run riot and we shall pay the piper
in the end, as we always do. We have got to build up a fine
sense of responsibility, of subordination of self to a larger interest, of loyalty to the group, of observance of the rules of the
game, of repression of the instinct to win by playing hard,
which only too often means fouling the line. We must all join
forces or else the self-seeking, individualistic, profit-making motive will engulf us all. In the Herald-Tribunemagazine section
of December 6, 1931, Count Sforza, reviewing conditions in Germany, says of Germany: "Virtually nobody believes any longer
in the sanction of the individualistic principles of the nineteenth
century." Of course, this point of view is spreading throughout
the world. Conservative England is coming to this point of
view. Men in our own country are coming to this point of view.
The conservative New York Herald-Tiibune in the same issue,
discussing the testimony of Mr. Charles E. Mitchell, chairman
of the board of the National City Bank, before the Senate Committee during the previous week, says the great economic issue
"is not between governmental control and unrestrained private
enterprise, but between regulation from Washington, and regulation from within industry." We must "modify the anarchy
curb the individual . . . conof free competition . . ..
trol the forces of supply and demand in the interests of a more
stable economic order." Isn't it clear that if there is to be this
control, it must either come through rules of the game made by
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the players themselves, or through some outside agency? Either
there must be the force of law with governmental sanction and
governmental power back of the rules, or it must come through
the self-restraint, the self-discipline of those who play the game.
In short, must we not learn, in industry, in trade, in banking,
to apply the ordinary morality of the true sportsman to the
business in hand? We must learn to be as rigorous in imposing
upon ourselves the restraints of the rules of the game we play
in the city on five days in the week as we are in imposing upon
ourselves the rules of the game we play in the country over the
week-ends or on holidays. That, indeed, is the essence of
bar association activity. That is what we are doing in the field
of establishing and maintaining big standards which we want
to apply to all practitioners. We should like our friends, the
corporate fiduciaries, to understand this point of view. It is
very fundamental. And when they do understand it, we shall
work together, lawyers and bankers, in a common endeavor to
improve each other's position in the community as servants.
I am quite aware of the fact that there is a wide margin
between the precepts of our profession and the practices of
some of our members, and yet, having been chairman of the
grievance committee of the state bar association of my state for
five years, I am prepared to state that relatively-especially in
these times of economic competition-I know of no group of
men who have stood up to their fiduciary obligations in greater
measure than the legal profession. The examples where men
have fallen are conspicuous, as conspicuous as the divorce cases
are, compared with the multitude of happy marriages and fine
family relations. There is nothing sensational in a lawyer who
performs his duty against his own self-interest. It does not
make headlines in the newspapers, but it goes on just the same.
Only a few weeks ago the New York County Lawyers' Association tendered a dinner to a fine lawyer and a fine judge.
When he arose to his feet to make response, he received the
greatest ovation that I have ever heard tendered to a man performing public service quietly and modestly. His address had
all the fine literary qualities of the scholar that he is. Near its
end he struck a note and used a figure which I should like to
borrow at this point:
"A myth has grown up about the profession of the law, a fable, a tradition, not always the truth as seen and realized in conduct, but none the
less the chief thing about the profession, the thing that makes it worth
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while, the thing that ennobles it, the thing that it really is in its best and
truest moments, the thing without which, we may be sure, it would wither
and die. The tradition, the ennobling tradition, though it be myth as well
as verity, that surrounds as with an aura the profession of the law, is the
bond between its members and one of the great concerns of man, the cause
of justice upon earth."
It is perhaps too early to expect that the newer professions,
that business itself shall be inspired by such a myth as this.
I wonder how soon the standards of fiduciary responsibility, of
single-minded devotion to duty, will dominate the business world,
as indeed they dominate our profession? And yet as the days
of unrestrained anarchic individualism pass by and newer days
appear of group responsibility and self-government, perhaps
our Bar standards of self-restraint, our experience in group control, our standards of fiduciary duty and responsibility may
prove to be a real contribution. Certainly we should hold fast
to them for ourselves, not in our own self-interest, but simply
because in this rapidly changing world of ours they constitute
some of the few possessions to which we can really hold fast
with confidence in their enduring value. Indeed, as things look
now, they may turn out to be the world's very best possessions.
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